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THE

SÂNKHYA PHILOSOPHY

Stated, Explained, and Compared with Kindred Systems

BY

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THE SÂNKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

[*A paper read before the Students's Literary and Scientific Society of Bombay, by Mr. Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar, 13th March* 1871.]

OF the six systems of philosophy regarded as orthodox that of the Sânkhyas is one. The Sânkhya doctrines claim a very high antiquity. Perhaps the earliest philosophical speculations of the Indian Âryas ran in this direction and in that of a kindred system known in later times as the Vedânta. Some of the terms characteristic of the Sânkhya School are to be met with in the Upanishads;[1] and though S'ankarâchârya in his Vedânta Bhâshya has brought forward very elaborate arguments[2] to prove that they have no reference to that system but to his own, an unsectarian reader can have very little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the Sânkhya doctrines are set forth in those places. There is scarcely a Purâṇa[3] that does not give an account of the creation of the universe in accordance with this system; though in a greatly modified form and in a manner which indicates that the original significance of the Sânkhya doctrines, as I conceive it, was not clearly understood. In the Bhagavad-gîtâ[4] allusions are now and then made to the philosophy of this school and several

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1. Kaṭha Bib. Ind. page, 114-15; Svet. Bib. Ind. page 336-37. and Maitrâyaṇîya Upanishad 6-10.

2. Vedânta Sûtra Bhâshya chap I pada 4, adh. I-II.

3. See Bhâgavata sk. III. chap. V; Mâtsya, Poona edn. Chap. III.; Agni, Bib. Ind. chap. 17, page 41; Mârkaṇḍeya, chap. 45, page 258, Bib. Ind. 4. Chap. III. 3, 27, 42.

chapters are devoted to it in the S'ânti-parva[5] of the Mahâbhârata. So that, it appears that the system along with or supplemented by the Vedânta, with which however it is often confounded, has worked itself into the ordinary belief of the Hindus. But in spite of this, the Sânkhya philosophy has long been driven away from the curriculum of Sanskrit Students on this side of India, and I have not heard of any S'âstri in the Marathi or Gujarathi country having devoted himself to it and nearly all know but little about it. But in the North and the Gaud country a better treatment is accorded to it. It is more generally studied and a chair for it exists in the Benares Sanskrit College.

But from the mere fact that the doctrines of the Sânkhyas are to be met with in very ancient works, it does not necessarily follow that these speculations were systematized at the time when those works were written. No fact is plainer in the history of Sanskrit literature than this that the body of notions embodied under each S'âstra was not conceived at once by the chief writer on the subject, but that before they were put into that shape, they had gone through a process of growth and development. But the Sânkhya philosophy seems to have been very early reduced to a system. The name Sânkhya about the etymology[6] of which

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5 Chaps 308-9, 312-17.

6 Mahâbh. सांख्यदर्शनमेतत्ते परिसंख्यानमुत्तमं। एवंहि परिसंख्याय सांख्याः केवलतां गताः। तत्वानि च चतुर्विंशत् परिसंख्याय.&c.; Mâtsya सांख्यं संख्यात्मकत्वाच्च कपिलादिभिरुच्यते. In these सांख्यं is derived from संख्या 'number' and the S'âstra is so called on account of its enumeration of the 25 principles. This etymology appears to be correct. The scholiasts explain the term by सम्यक्ख्यानं ज्ञानं *true knowledge*. See S'ankara and S'ridhara on Gîtâ 2-39; 3-3.

there is much dispute could not have been invented before the floating mass of the Sânkhya doctrines obtained fixity and stability. And this name occurs in one at least[7] of the earlier Upanishads and in the Bhagavadgîtâ[8] and other parts of the Mahâbhârata. The person to whom an almost unanimous tradition ascribes the authorship of the system is Kapila. In the Bhâgavata he is represented as an avatâra of Vishnu[9]; and his name occurs in the S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad[10] where the creator of the Universe is spoken of "as having nourished Kapila the R.ishi with knowledge and seen him born." S'ankarâchârya whose great object is to show that the philosophy of the Sânkhyas has no basis in the hallowed S'ruti considers the Kapila here alluded to, to be that R.ishi who burnt the sons of Sagara to ashes by a curse and not the author of the system he is combating.[11] But the Bhâgavata represents the enemy of Sagara's sons to be the founder of the school of the Sânkhyas,[12] and there can be little occasion for the mention of such a person as the former, if he is to be considered as a different individual from the latter, in such a work as the S'vetâs'vatara Upanishad, devoted as it is, to the investigation of the soul of the Universe. But which of the existing works on the system is to be ascribed to Kapila or whether any work written by him has come down to us at all, is a question which it is not very easy to answer. A collection of Sûtras entitled Sânkhya-Pravachana is ascribed to him; but the very name of this work is unknown on this side of India. Mâdhava in his Sarvadars'ana Sangraha does not mention it

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7 S'vetâs'vatara, Bib. Ind. page 366.
8 chap. 3-3, 9 I sk. 3. chap.; II sk. 7 chap.
10 S'vet. Bib. Ind. p. 351-2.
11 अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुर्वासुदेवनाम्नः स्मरणात् । Vedânta Bhâshya Chap. II. pâda 1 sutra 1.
12 IX sk. 8 Chap.

though in setting forth the doctrines of each school, he in most cases first gives the title of the work of the founder and in several, an analysis of its contents. The only Sânkhya-Pravachana known to him is the leading treatise of the Yoga school of which he gives a short abstract; while his observations on the Sânkhya philosophy are based on Îs'varakṛishna's Kârikâs. The Sânkhya-Pravachana, too, attributed to Kapila bears altogether a modern air about it. Next in importance to the leading treatise on a particular S'âstra is the *bhâshya* on it. Such *bhâshyas* in the case of the other S'âstras were written by persons, who, in consiquence of their work, enjoy great reputation, and are to be referred to a pretty high antiquity. All subsequent writers never style their elucidatory works *bhâshyas* but give them the name of vṛitti[13] or vârtika. Such for instance is the case with the Mîmânsâ, Vedânta, Nyâya, and Vyâkaraṇa *bhâshyas*, the authors of which, S'abara, S'ankara, Vâtsyâyana, and Patanjali are widely known and justly held in reverence, and flourished, all of them, before the tenth century of the Christian Era. While the only *bhâshya* on the Sânkhya Pravachana, is that by Vijnânabhikshu who, Dr. Hall thinks, flourshed in the sixteenth or seventeenth century and not earlier than Mâdhava, since he does not appear to have known him. It is hard to believe on the supposition of the high antiquity of the Sânkhya-Pravachana, that it could have remained without a *bhâshya* for so many centuries, considering the importance of the S'âstra itself. For these and other reasons, I think that the Sânkhya Pravachana is not a work of high antiquity, and could not have been written by Kapila. But there are several works of authority on the subject and among these, that of Îs'varakṛishna, the Kârikâs,

13 The Vṛitti on the Vedânta sutra alluded to by S'ankara of course, existed before S'ankara.

enjoys great reputation. Dr. Hall greatly praises Vijnâna Bhikshu, but to me he appears to be a very unsafe guide, since his great object seems to be to bring the Vedânta and the Sânkhya as close as possible.

It is time now that I should enter into the philosophy of Kapila. The world is full of misery. Man's sufferings in it are of three kinds; those originating with his body and his mind (*Âdhyâtmika*). He is liable to disease, such as fever, dysentery or cholera, and to mental anguish caused by such an occurrence as the death of a child, wife or friend. 2. Then again the creatures around him are often the source of great trouble to him. Mosquitoes, bugs, snakes crocodiles, sharks, vultures, tigers, wolves, and even his fellow men render his existence intolerable to him (*Âdhi-bhautika*) And even the gods will not let him alone. They will send down lighting on his head, or blow away his house by a hurricane (*Âdhi-daivika*). Nothing that we see, will free us from these evils. Even after death we have another existence in which our fate pursues us and we are again subjected to these very ills. The S'ruti tells us to perform sacrifices or practise some other virtues and for these deeds, promises us a place in Heaven where we shall be happy. But even here, the happiness allowed us, is just in proportion to our deserts, and after a time, must come to an end. It is not pure, complete, absolute. How then to secure this absolute bliss or this absolute cessation from pain? This is the problem Kapila has undertaken to solve. "Reflect," says he, "what your miseries arise from? If from the nature of your soul, there is no help for you. But they do not arise from the nature of your soul, their cause is totally different; separate yourself from that cause, and you will be happy."

Then the nature of the soul and of the world which is the source of affliction, are set forth in the

shape of twenty-five *tatvas* or principles, a knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of eternal beatitude. The first is *Prakṛiti* or *pradhâna,* the original principle or cause of all, which consists in the equipoise of the three qualities ; *satva,* light, brightness or goodness ; *rajas,* passion or feeling, and *tamas,* darkness, pain, ignorance. The first is the soure of happiness, and its function is to render anything manifest and clear, from the second, action originates, and from the third, pain, stability, stolidity or stupour. From this *pradhâna* is produced by a process of development, the principle of *mahat* or *buddhi* which is translated *intelligence* but which I consider to be equivalent to *finite or conditioned intelligence.* This *buddhi* assumes four forms when the quality of goodness prevails in it over the other two; viz *dharma* or virtue, *jnâna* or knowledge, *vairâgya* or freedom from earthly affection, and *ais'varya* or magical power, such as is ascribed to a *yogin.* When the quality of darkness prevails, this same *buddhi* appears in the form of *adharma* or vice, *ajnâna* or ignorance, *avairâgya* or earthly affection and *anais'varya* or absence of extraordinary power. This *mahat-tatva* or *buddhi* gives birth to *ahankâra,* consciousness of individuality or egoism; which in its turn, when *satva* or light is predominant, produces the five senses and the five organs of action. The five senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling ; and the five organs of action are the speech, hand, foot, and the organs of excretion and regeneration. *Manas* which sets in motion both these groups is an organ of sense as well as action. It is to be translated by the words *will* and *attention.* When in the principle of consciousness, the quality of *tamas* or darkness prevails, it produces the five subtle elements, the rudiments of the objects of the five senses. And from these subtle elements are pro-

duced in a developed or grosser form, *âkâs'a* or sky, *tejas* or light, *prithivî* or earth, *vâyu* or wind, and *âpas* or water, which are the objects of the senses of hearing, seeing, smelling, touch and taste, respectively. We thus get twenty-four principles, and the last is *purusha* or soul which is pure, eternal, and absolute. *Purusha* is incapable of action, but has light and life, while *pradhâna* or *prakṛiti* whose products we have noticed is *achetuna* i. e. has no life or light, but possesses the power of action. *Purusha* is like a *pangu* or man without legs who has got eyes, and *prakṛiti* has got legs but no eyes (*andha*). Hence left to themselves, the *andha* and *pangu* would not be able to move but if they agree that the *pangu* with eyes should sit on the shoulders of the *andha*, then they both can go over any distance they choose. In the same manner, if *purusha* and *prakṛiti* were disjoined, the world would not exist, and it is their union that sets *prakṛiti* in motion and all things up to the five gross elements are produced. It is in consequence of this union that *purusha* appears to be active, though not so in reality, and *prakṛiti* has the appearance of something living or *chetana*.

In every sensation or present act of sense, *buddhi* or intelligence, *ahankâra* or consciousness, *manas* or will and attention, together with the particular organ of sense, are concerned; while in a past or future act of sense i. e. in recalling a past or conceiving a possible sensation, the first three only are employed. These three, therefore, are internal faculties of cognition, and the organs of sense and action are called external faculties. These thirteen faculties together with the five subtle elements form what is called the *sûkshma s'arîra* or subtle body. At death, the gross elements of the human body only are destroyed, while this subtle body assumes several gross bodies and appears in the world again. If this

subtle body is instinct with virtue it goes up, if with vice it goes below, if with *jnâna* or real knowledge i. e. of course, of the twenty-five principles, it is cast off, and the soul attains *Moksha* or its original absoluteness.

This, in brief, is the system of the Sânkhyas. To one who really attempts to understand it and to reduce it to a modern shape, not a few difficulties present themselves. What is the nature of this *prakṛiti* or *pradhâna* which, united with the *purusha,* is said to be the origin of all things, and in what sense can it be said to produce intelligence and through it, *ahankâra* or consciousness, and through this again, the subtle elements and thence the world? The books themselves on the S'âstra, do not explain this satisfactorily and Vijnâna Bhikshu says that the order of production of these principles rests on the authority of the S'âstra alone and is a thing that cannot be proved.[14] But a S'âstra which requires things to be taken on trust, is no S'âstra. The Purâṇas too afford us no help. The Mâtsya[15]

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14 अत्र प्रकृतेर्महान्महतोहंकार इत्यादि सृष्टिक्रमे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्। अनुमानेन सामान्यतः कार्याणां सकारणकत्वमात्रसिद्धेः। न तु सृष्टौ भूतादिक्रमो वान्तःकरणादिक्रमो वेत्येकतरावधारकमनुमानं संभवति। Sânkhya Sâra. The only evidence for the production of *Mahat* from *Prakriti* and of *Ahankâra* from *Mahat* is the S'âstra itself; from inference, one can arrive only at the general conclusion that an effect has a cause; but as to production, there can be no inference calculated to show whether the gross elements are first produced, and thence the internal organs, or these latter first and from them, the elements.

15 सविकारात्प्रधानात्तु महत्तत्वं प्रजायते। महानिति यतः ख्यातिर्लोकानां जायते सदा॥ गुणेभ्यः क्षोभ्यमाणेभ्यस्त्रयो देवा विजज्ञिरे। एकमूर्तिस्त्रयो भागा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः॥

tells us that from *mahat-tatva* is produced the Puranic Trinity. With an excess of *satva*, *mahat* is Vishnu, of *rajas*, it is Brahmâ, and of *tamas*, it is Rudra. And as a general rule, the Sânkhya principles are represented by them as having been first produced or set in motion by the creator, at the time of the creation, and are personified and put into the ranks of gods.[16] Colebrooke thinks *prakṛiti* to be "eternal matter, indiscrete, undistinguishable, as destitute of parts." If so, it is like the eternal *paramâṇus* or atoms of the Vais'eshikas, and in this case the Sânkhyas ought to be consistent and represent, like the Vais'eshikas, the production of such things as *dvyaṇuka*, *trasareṇu* (small pieces of matter) and *ghata* (pot) from it and not that of *buddhi, jnâna, dharma, dayâ, ahankâra* and such other purely mental states. We must also bear in mind, that the union of this *prakṛiti* with the soul is considered necessary for the production of the result though the soul is regarded as incapable of action. What is the necesity of this union, if *prakṛiti* were matter in the ordinary sense? Professor Wilson also considers *prakṛiti* as the material cause of things. To me, however, the system of Kapila appears to disclose an idealistic view of nature. The position of Idealism is this. I know directly what passes in my consciousness. I am conscious of certain sensations of which, I believe myself not to be the cause. To account for them, I suppose the existence of an external nature. But this is simply an inference necessitated by the constitution of my mind, i. e. the external world, for me exists in consequence of a law of my intellect. Beyond my consciousness and my intellect, there is no warranty for the existence of the external world. Whence arises the necessity of the supposition of its existence?

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16 Bhâgavata, SK. III. Chap. V. and Mâhbh. S'ântip.

In consciousness, there are feelings and representations i. e. I feel myself tied down to a particular state, my freedom is restrained, my free activity is limited. Who has limited me? Certainly not the external world, for it is my own creation. It is to account for that limitation of my free activity that I posit it. The limitation is prior, the supposition of the external world is subsequent. I feel my activity impaired, and so much as I feel is taken away from me, I attribute to something else. I simply objectivise my subjective feeling. We must then look for this limitation of the *me* in the state of the intellect previous to consciousness; for when the *me* awoke, it awoke with its limitations, with the *not me*. These limitations, therefore, point to the nature of the intellect just as the little red, green, and blue clouds visible to the eye when it is dazzled, indicate the structure of the organ itself and do not exist in themselves.

This is the Idealism of Fichte, the German philosopher. Let us compare Kapila's system with it. We must here distinguish between four things. In the state of consciousness when the *me* feels itself limited, the intellect first of all posits or affirms the *me*, and then opposes to itself the *not me*. The *not me* is apprehended as limiting the me, putting it into a definite state. The limitation of the *me* implies its previous freedom or unlimitedness. Had it not been absolutely free or unlimited it would not have felt itself limited. If finiteness were its nature these limitations would not awaken it., *i. e.* consciousness would be impossible. The four things then are :—the *ego. i. e.* the finite *ego*, the *non-ego*, *the limitation or limiting*, and the *free, unlimited* or *absolute ego*, i.e. the *ego* previous to consciousness. Now, Kapila's *ahankâra* corresponds to the finite *ego* and the five subtle

and gross elements together with their counterparts, the senses, which without this *ego* would not exist in consciousness, and which consequently, in the language of our philosopher, are produced by the *ego*, correspond to the *non-ego*. The free, unlimited, absolute *ego* is *purusha* and its limitation by the *non-ego* is the *bandha* or *sanga* which ties us down to this world. But Fichte has told us that the limitation of the *ego* is the result of something that had passed in the intellect previous to consciousness, previous to the *positing* of the *ego*. This, according to Kapila, is the principle of *buddhi* or *mahat*, which produces *ahankâra* or the ego. But here there is a difference between the two philosophers, a difference due to the object with which each started in this inquiry. Kapila had in view the liberation of the soul from its fetters. Fichte wanted to explain the world. That limitation of the free *ego*, then, which Fichte derives from the nature of that *ego* is ascribed by Kapila to a cause which is distinct from it. It is *pradhâna*, a combination of the three qualities and its product, the principle of *mahat*. But this is not an external object in the ordinary sense, for *buddhi* and *ahankâra* which are its immediate products and *manas* are, as we abserved before, called by the Sânkhyas, *âbhyantara karaṇas* (internal organs), and virtue, compassion, the faculties of acquiring knowledge &c. which are comprehended under *buddhi* are, of course, not external things which latter, as we have seen, are produced only after *ahankâra* has been affirmed. Again, this remarkable peculiarity shows the logical consistency of Kapila. To state that the *me* believes itself to have been absolutely free and unlimited and at the same time to deduce its limitations from its essence involves a contradiction. It is tantamount to saying that the absolutely free and unlimited is not free and unlimited, This is one

of the charges brought against Fichte by his critics, from which Kapila escapes by affirming that since the *absolute* and the *infinite* cannot be *conditioned* and *finite*, the limitations are due to a distinct cause which in its nature is finite and whose finiteness, from its intimate connection with the infinite *ego*, the *ego* attributes to itself from ignorance. On this account, the system of Kapila is not a perfectly subjective Idealism as Fichte's is. Now, since all our cognitions and feelings are either good or bad, quiescent or active, true or false, right or wrong, the finite cause of all these must be composed of the three qualities, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The finite *ego* is either a cognizing or a moral subject; it is, therefore, prepared for these functions by *buddhi* which instills those principles into it. If it did not possess those principles or instincts, it would not be fit for an intellectual or moral life, and perception or action would not follow *i. e.* the finite *ego* would not be born at all. Hence it is, that it is said to be produced by *buddhi*. Born with the intellectual and moral instinct, it realizes them and creates objects suited to them and so the external world and the organs of sense and action come into existence. We thus see that the system of the Sânkhyas distinguishes between the *finite* and the *infinite* soul, the *limited* and the *free*. The unlimited or infinite soul is not capable of our present life, the finite is; but this its finiteness is, according to the system, not its own attribute, but of another principle which, in reality, it is, that in conjunction with the infinite soul leads this moral and intellectual life which we call ours. If we separate ourselves from this principle, our bonds are broken, and we are again free and absolute. This is *moksha*.[17]

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17. As this is the central idea of many of the most important Hindu systems, and as it is often, by modern writers on Indian Philosophy, confounded with non-exis-

This idea of the absolute or limitless soul and this kind of idealism more or less modified runs through all the religio-philosophical literature of the country.[18] Indeed, if this were an isolated instance, grave doubts might reasonably be entertained about the explantion, I have attempted, of the Sânkhya system. There are striking resemblances between the metaphysics of Kapila and of the Buddhistic Schools. The Vedânta, also, bears some affinity to it. The *Mâyâ* of that system is often regarded as equivalent to *pradhâna* or *prakṛiti,* and the two expressions are frequently, in unsystematic works, confounded. The doctrines of the Yogâchâra School of the Buddhists are, that the only existing thing is the *ego,* and the external and finite world is a phantom. As to one whose eyes are affected with the disease called *timira,* two moons appear instead of one, so does the world appear to exist to the *ego* affected with the disease called *vâsanâ* (*habit*). This *vâsanâ* assumes various forms and this it is, that leads the *ego* to picture to itself the external world and is the cause of all our feelings and passions.[19] The great object of a

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tence or *nihil,* I quote the following lines from Wordsworth, which would give an idea of what is considered to be the state of the soul after it is freed from the trammels of the world. What is meant is a condition in which "thought is not," in which the soul is free from any definite representation. His spirit drank

The spectacle: sensation, soul, and form,
All melted into him; they swallowed up
His animal being; in them did he live,
And by them did he live; they were his life.
In such access of mind, in such high hour
Of visitation from the living God
Thought was not; in enjoyment it expired.

This resembles closely the description of the freed soul given by the Vedântins, in particular.

18. Bhagavadgîtâ, 3 27 and S'ântiparva, fol 210, Bom. edn.

19. Sarva-dars'ana Sangraha, Bib. Ind. pages, 16-17; S'ankarâchârya's Bhâshya, II-2-28.

human being, therefore, ought to be, by practising the virtues and duties imposed by Buddha on his followers, to free the soul from this *vâsanâ*, the root of all evil.[20] This, then, resembles the idealism of Kapila. The external world is reduced to states of consciousness and, along with our finite thoughts and feelings, is derived from a certain power called *vâsanâ* which is not of the essence of the *me* and though it resides in it, is separable from it. Then by a transition not unusual in the history of Philosophy, the *Mâdhhyamikas*, another sect, deny the existence of both the internal and the external world, and end in *nihilism*. With them, *vâsanâ* is the cause of both, and when, by the discipline enjoined by their master, this is rooted out, nothing remains and this is their *nirvâṇa*.[21] Then, again, another school, that of the *Sautrântikas*, starting from a subjective basis, similarly with these two, admits the existence of external objects, but only as the result of an inference that cannot be avoided. They say that if the *vâsanâ* producing such a representation as that of a blue object for instance, exists in the soul, it must always produce that representation, that is, we must always see a blue object. But we see it only occasionally; therefore, the cause of that representation must exist out of the *ego*.[22] But the forms of external objects are supplied to them by the intellect; they are the creations of our mind.[23] This external world, and the internal one of finite thoughts and feelings, are capable of

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20. Sarva-dars'. p. 17.
21. Sarva-dars'. p. 15.
22. Sarva-dars.' p. 19.
23. Jagaddhara, in his commentary on Mâlatî-Mâdhava, incidentally, gives the Sautrântika doctrine thus:—लिखिते वेति सौत्रान्तिकमतोपदर्शनम् । तत्र हि ज्ञानेन स्वीयाकारार्पणं विषये क्रियत इति तत्तदाकारस्याभिव्यक्तिः।

destruction or separation from the soul, (*nirodha*), and the way to this, is the discipline spoken of before (*mârga*). When they are thus destroyed, pure intelligence alone remains, and the soul attains *moksha*.[24] We thus see how closely these schools are connected. The philosopy of the Sautrântikas may be compared to that of Kant, that of the Yogâcharas to Fichte's, while that of the Mâdhyamikas is *nihilism*. But all the schools start from a subjective basis and are idealistic, in which respect they resemble the Sânkhya system.

Professor Max Müller remarks in the Chips, that all authors who write on Buddhism always go on the supposition that the metaphysics of Buddhism were derived from Kapila, but he does not see any grounds for this belief. Such ideas as the transmigration of souls are common to all Hindu philosophers, wherefore their occurrence in the Sânkhya and Buddhistic systems would not afford an indication of the one having borrowed them from the other. This is quite true, but the special co-incidences which he denies, I humbly think, do exist. Deriving the external world from states of consciousness; referring these along with the feelings and passions to a finite cause; and distinguishing this cause from the infinite soul are the essential doctrines of both the systems. The only difference is that the finite cause of the Sânkhyas is indestructible, while that of the Buddhists is not. But this difference is more apparent than real. The *pradhâna* of the Sânkhyas is capable of separation from the soul and the word *nirodha*, used by the Sautrântikas to denote the disappeance of their finite cause, means much the same thing. However, even if we recognise a real difference on this point, it may well be considered as due to a further development of one and the same system.

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24. Sarvadars' p. 22.

Again, the denial of God, as the controller of the universe, which is common to both the systems, is not a mere accidental or general coincidence. It is a necessary consequence of the systems and indicates their essential identity. The problem which both undertake to solve is, freeing the soul from misery. Misery arises from the external world and from our feelings. The external world is subjectivised and referred along with the feelings to a finite cause, the destruction of which sets the soul, infinite and absolute in its nature, at liberty. The problem is solved. And in this way of solving it, there is no room for a controller of the universe. The systems, however, do not deny the existence of gods or superhuman beings. They exist bnt their constitution is similar to that of man. There are *prakṛiti* and *purusha*, even there, but some of the effects of *prakṛiti* do not exist in their case. They have only subtle bodies or only the internal organs, and not the gross substances with which we find ourselves united.

There is another striking resemblance. Some Buddhistic schools give the order in which the world is produced, thus:—First of all there is *ignorance* from which arise *feelings* such as those of love and hatred. Then follows *consciousness* which gives birth to *names and forms* (the external world) and in this manner, the *senses*, the *contact of the senses with the world*, *pleasure* or *pain*, *desire*, *virtue* and *vice*, *birth*, *old age*, *death*, *lamentation*, *sorrow* and *distress*, are, successively produced, one from the other.[25] This order closely

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25. अविद्यादीनामितरेतरकारणत्वादुपपद्यते लोकयात्रा। ते चाविद्यादयोऽविद्या संस्कारो विज्ञानं नाम रूपं षडायतनं स्पर्शो वेदना तृष्णोपादानं भवो जातिर्जरा मरणं शोकः परिवेदना दुःखं दुर्मनस्तेत्येवंजातीयका इतरेतरहेतुकाः। S'ankarâchârya's Vedânta Bhâshya, Bib. Ind. p. 549, Vol. I, See also Govindânanda on the same.

resembles that of the Sânkhyas. Ignorance corresponds to *pradhâna*, love and hatred to *buddhi*, consciousness to *ahankâra*, and so on. The principle of both is the same, though there may be differences in the particulars. For these reasons, there is, I think, sufficient ground to believe, that though the Buddhistic systems may not have sprung directly from the Sânkhya, they derived their origin from the same current of thought and are to be referred to the same or immediately successive ages. And having arrived thus far, the balance of probability is, in my opinion, in favour of the supposition that the Sânkhyas preceded the Buddhists.

Again, the Professor thinks the Buddhistic *nirvâṇa* to be total annihilation, and refers to the sacred book Abhidharma said to have been written by Kâs'yapa, the friend and pupil of Buddha. I have had no access to this book, but with due deference, I must say, that if Mâdhava has given the doctrines of the several sects rightly, the *nirvâṇa* of the Mâdhyamikas only is annihilation, while the *summum bonum* of the other schools is the separation of the free and unlimited soul from the finite force we observe in it, as the reader may have seen.[26]

The coincidences between the Sânkhya and the Buddhistic systems will derive greater significance if we compare and contrast the Vedânta with them. The absolute soul is the central idea of the Vedânta as well as of the Sânkhya. But the problem with the Vedântins was not, simply to teach the way to eternal bliss, but also to restore the In-

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26. Sarvadars': Mâdhy. परनिर्वाणं शून्यरूपं सेत्स्यति। Yog. निखिलवासनोच्छेदविगलितविविधविषयाकारोपप्लवविशुद्धविज्ञानोदयो महोदयः। Sautr. तदुभयनिरोधः। तदनन्तरं विमलज्ञानोदयो वा मुक्तिः। See also p. 116.

dian race to the *S'ruti,* which the Sânkhyas had affected to reverence, and the Buddhists openly defied, and to God. Revelation is, therefore, the basis of the system. The second sûtra of Bâdarâyaṇa, the first being simply introductory, brings in at once, the idea of God as the Creator of the world. According to the Vedânta, then, there is first, God and the individual soul. God is the sum total of the individual souls. He first creates the five elements, and from these five, the senses, and thence the two internal faculties (*manas* and *buddhi*). From the elements are also produced the organs of action, and the five *winds* in the body. The last seventeen constitute the subtle body, which follows us after death; and the gross one is created by a certain elaborate process of mixture, called *panchîkaraṇa.* The sum total of the subtle bodies with the soul in it is another body of God called Hiraṇyagarbha; and all the gross bodies with the souls, consitute a third, distinguished by the name of Vais'vânara.[27] Here, then, is an attempt to seek the *absolute* objectively, which the Sânkhyas arrive at, subjectively. But equally with these, the Vedântins hold the subject also to be absolute. To establish identity betweeh these two, and secure *moksha,* finite thinking and the finite manifestations of the real or external absolute must be dissolved, *buddhi* and matter, the creations of God, must be destroyed. If by creation is to be understood a development of the Divine essence, this object cannot be gained. For the development must be as real as the essence itself. S'ankarâchârya, therefore, rejects this theory[28] and attributes creation to a certain power

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27. Vedânta Sâra; Panchadas'î of Bharatî-tîrtha, viveka I.

28. S'ankarâcharya's Bhâshya II-1-14, Bib. Ind. p. 447, and 453 I. vol. This theory called *pariṇâmavâda* was afterwards taken up by Râmânuja, in whose hands, it became the basis of a religious system more practical than S'ankara's.

in the Divine essence, which cannot be considered as existing, because its effects would no less exist, nor as non-existing, for the eftects are perceptible.[29] It is *mâyâ* or delusion which generates appearances, such as those of a mirage. And the individual soul which in its essence is the same as the Universal soul, and is absolute, is enclosed by a similar veil of delusion and confounds himself with the creations of God's *mâyâ* and attributes their finiteness to himself. That the gross and subtle bodies are such creations is shown by the conditions in which we find ourselves, in sleep. In dreamy sleep, the gross body of flesh and blood does not exist for the individnal soul, while the subtle does, and this latter also ceases to be, in sound sleep. But even in sound sleep, the soul is still enveloped in *avidyâ* or ignorance which is *mâyâ* itself as refering to the individual soul. These *avidyâ* and *mâyâ* are got rid of by the concentration of the mind in the manner prescribed by the Yoga philosophers, joined with moral discipline, and as the result of the process, the soul issues forth into its transcendent condition and is pure intelligence and joy.

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29. सत्वासत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयम् । Vedânta-Sâra; न शून्यं नापिसद्यादृक्तादृक्तत्वमिहेष्यताम् । Bhâratîtîrtha, Panch-Viveka II.

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